Les principaux problèmes que Bultmann a posés au plan de l’exégèse historique des textes évangéliques étaient commandés par des positions théologiques et continuent pour ce motif à interroger les théologiens catholiques, qui parfois le rejettent dans le camp tantôt du scientisme tantôt du dogmatisme.Contre la théologie libérale des « vies de Jésus », il élève une double protestation, d’ordre christologique : il revendique le caractère historique de la foi chrétienne, et historique : il prend au sérieux la visée eschatologique de (...) la prédication de Jésus. Marquée en ses origines par un rationalisme dogmatique, l’exégèse historico-critique travaille à son tour la théologie, l’oblige à assumer sa propre historicité et à sortir ainsi de son propre positivisme dogmatique.Réservant – à juste titre – à la foi de dire le sens de la Croix, Bultmann semble séparer le fait et le sens et mettre l’historiographie et la théologie en rapport contradictoire de double vérité. Nous savons mieux aujourd’hui qu’il n’y a de faits qu’interprétés ; la foi atteint la vérité historique des faits, mais doit renoncer à demander de les établir « scientifiquement » à une historiographie censée « objectivement neutre ». En soutenant que le sens de la Croix relève d’une décision de foi, Bultmann nous rappelle utilement, ainsi que l’a reconnu R. Marlé, qu’on ne peut jamais évacuer le skandalon de la foi.The principal problems that Bultmann presented as regards the historical exegesis of evangelical texts were guided by theological positions and continued, for this reason, to question Catholic theologians, who sometimes put him in the camp of scientism and sometimes in that of dogmatism.Against the liberal theology of the “lives of Jesus”, he raised a double protest : of a christological nature and of a historical nature . Marked in its origins by dogmatic rationalism, historical-critical exegesis works in its turn on theology, obliges it to assume its own historicity and this to escape from its own dogmatic positivism.Allowing faith – and for good reason – to decide the meaning of the Cross, Bultmann seems to separate the fact and the meaning and to put historiography and theology in contradictory rapport of a double truth. We know better today that there are only interpreted facts ; faith attains the historical truth of facts, but must renounce the demand to establish them “scientifically” to a historiography believed to the “objectively neutral”. In holding that the meaning of the Cross depends on a decision of faith, Bultmann helpfully reminds us, as R. Marlé recognized, that one can never escape the skandalon of faith. (shrink)

There are doubtless many with personal experience of suffering, or of comforting others in distress, who would agree with Milton thus far that philosophic argument is powerless to satisfy those who in their anguish ask the question ‘Why did it happen to me?’ Yet to think so is to underestimate both the necessity and the power of reason: clarity of mind and the disposition to argue are commonly enhanced rather than diminished by suffering; and if reason is an essential part (...) of man's nature, it should serve him, if anywhere, in the trials of life. We have every justification, therefore, despite common opinion, for seeking a rational answer to the question proposed. It must, however, be admitted at the outset that there is no direct answer to the question which can both withstand critical scrutiny and bring genuine comfort to the afflicted, an answer, that is, which accepts the question as it stands with its attendant presuppositions; but there is an indirect answer, which, precisely by rejecting one or more of these presuppositions and restating the question, can indeed satisfy these two requirements. Before such an answer can be outlined, however, the question in its traditional form must be examined and the traditional answers to it critically reviewed. (shrink)

This paper reports a study of planning processes in the five-disc Tower of London (TOL) task in 20 younger and 20 older adult participants. A concurrent direct ''think-aloud'' method was used to obtain data on planning processes prior to moving discs in the TOL. A check was made of the effects of verbalising by comparing performance data from the experimental groups with data from control groups who did not verbalise during planning or moving. Verbalising slowed down planning and moving but (...) did not appear to distort the participants' approaches to the task. Older and younger participants did not differ in average moves taken to solve the tasks. However, older participants' planning was less complete and more error-prone than that of younger participants. The planning processes were characterised as showing a means-ends ''goal selection'' strategy. In this strategy participants (1) identify a single active goal disc at the start, (2) select moves and move sequences to enable the placing of the current goal disc in its target position, and (3) continue in this way until all discs are in their target positions. Age differences were found in the planning stage, during which there was no stimulus support and hence a substantial working memory load. During the move phase there was stimulus support and hence little loading of working memory. Age differences in moves required were not found in the move phase. As older participants tend to have depleted working memory capacity the present results suggest that working memory is heavily loaded in TOL planning but less so in the move phase of TOL. (shrink)

In the present book the fragments of the Syriac version of the treatise _De plantis_ as well as the text of the four other translations (Arabic, Latin, Greek, Hebrew) are edited afresh. A few of the numerous commentaries are added and the vexed question of whether Averroes had written a commentary on it is treated at some length.

The use of genetic technologies within the equine industries has become increasingly common since the horse genome was published in 2009 (Wade et al. 2009). Testing for genes coding for disease in...

Où se trouve le sérieux? L'auteur se pose cette question peu commune, et se met en quête d'une réponse. Il propose une articulation du sérieux selon les modes épistémologique, esthétique et éthique, pour l'approcher indirectement par le feint, le comique et le léger. Il s'attaque d'abord au problème que pose une quête du sérieux par le " feint ", ce qui le conduit à des interprétations originales du doute cartésien, du langage philosophique et de la connaissance scientifique : il distingue (...) le feint du fictif et du faux, mais constate aussi que le feint a tendance à se transformer en l'un ou en l'autre. L'auteur s'aventure ensuite dans le domaine esthétique où, à partir d'une critique de la théorie bergsonienne du rire, il développe sa propre interprétation du comique ; il soutient que la musique est l'art relativement le plus sérieux, mais que le sérieux comme tel est absent de l'art. Passant à la morale, il se voit obligé d'abord de s'expliquer avec les existentialistes français, ennemis déclarés du sérieux, puis, après une franche appréciation du sérieux de notre époque, d'admettre finalement que le léger y joue un rôle essentiel aussi. Distinguant en plus le sérieux du fanatique, l'auteur tente de préciser les rapports entre le sérieux et la foi, la Bible, et la pensée kierkegaardienne. Il conclut que la philosophie, et plus particulièrement la métaphysique, est le ressort du sérieux, mais que le philosophe est tenu par son sérieux même de chercher toujours plus loin. Le livre est écrit sous la forme de carnets, dans un style clair et engageant ; non dépourvu d'humour, il s'adresse à tout lecteur philosophiquement averti. (shrink)

Amongst Kant's lesser known early writings is a short treatise with the curious title Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Explained by Dreams of Metaphysics, in which, with considerable acumen and brilliance, and not a little irony, Kant exposes the empty pretensions of his contemporary, the Swedish visionary and Biblical exegete, Emanuel Swedenborg, to have access to a spirit world, denied other mortals. Despite his efforts, it must be feared, however, that Kant did not, alas, succeed in laying the spirit of Swedenborg (...) himself to rest once and for all, for there has arisen in our own day, and within philosophy itself, a movement of thought, if such it can be called, which, like that of Swedenborg, is founded upon an unbridled and unhealthy exercise of the imagination, and apparently believes that philosophical problems can be discussed and resolved by the elaboration of fantastical, and at times repulsive, examples; if we require a name for this contemporary pretence at philosophy, we could take as our model the Italian word for science fiction, fantascienza, and call it ‘fantaphilosophy’: it is my aim to show that this fantaphilosophy is a phantom philosophy. (shrink)

This article won the Mind prize essay competition announced last year, for an essay defending the academic pursuit of philosophy. The author is at present a free-lance philosopher; at the time of writing the paper he was a part time lecturer at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, in the department that has since closed. His collection of aphorisms, Sentences and Slogans has recently been published privately (for details, see 'Books Received').